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CASE COMMENTS
prohibit impeachment by prior conviction where the probative value is
outweighed by the possibility of jury misuse of the evidence.
73
By restricting, as the Frey court did, prior conviction evidence to
proceedings in which final sentencing has been passed, the possibility of
jury prejudice has been reduced. Admittedly, this is not in accord with the
historical rationale of impeachment, that being to demonstrate a witness's
questionable veracity through the fact of prior guilt. 74 However, in
requiring the technical interpretation of conviction, and thus making it
more difficult to introduce prior convictions as impeaching evidence, the
Frey court has refused to support the basic premise that mere
ascertainment of guilt in a prior proceeding necessarily demonstrates an
absence of credibility on the part of the defendant in a subsequent
proceeding.
JOHN ANTHONY WOLF
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
AND JOINT SEARCHES
The duality of the federal system has frequently provided a way for law
enforcement officials to avoid restrictive rules governing the procurement
of evidence which are enforced in federal courts but not in state courts,
and vice versa.' The Supreme Court's response to this situation has been
to control, through an exclusionary process, the admission in federal
courts of evidence illegally obtained by federal 2 and state3 officials.
Further, the Court has applied limits to the illegally obtained evidence
that state courts may admit. 4 There remain, however, situations where
evidence obtained in violation of prescribed law enforcement procedures
may continue to be used by law enforcement officers of one jurisdiction in
the courts of another. The restraints upon federal officers in state court
proceedings with regard to evidence obtained in violation of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure are somewhat unclear.5 There has been no
"E.g., United States v. Perea, 413 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1969); United States v. Hildreth,
387 F.2d 328 (4th Cir. 1967); Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965); State v.
Coca, 80 N.M. 95,451 P.2d 999 (1969).
7 Notes 60-62 supra.
'See Eichner, The "'Silver Platter"--No Longer Used for Serving Evidence in Federal
Courts, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 311 (1960).
2E.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
3E.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
'See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
5Compare Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956) with Wilson v. Schnettler, 365
U.S. 381 (1961) and Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392 (1963).
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Supreme Court ruling that a state is required to exclude evidence which is
the product of violations of the Federal Rules, 6 unless, of course, such
violations also exceed constitutional standards.' The federal courts have
been consistently reluctant to use their injunctive power to disrupt state
criminal proceedings.8 There is however, an avowed policy favoring
increased cooperation between federal and state law enforcement
officials, 9 and the injunctive supervision of federal officials by the federal
courts 0 may result in interference with state proceedings when a federal-
state endeavor does not conform to the Federal Rules.
A recent decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals" gives an
indication of the fine distinctions that are being drawn in this area. In
United States v. Navarro,'2 a city narcotics officer received a call from an
iiformer advising the officer that he had seen heroin in Navarro's home.
The officer prepared an affidavit which stated that he knew the informer,
had previously received information from him which proved correct, and
that the officer therefore had reason to believe that narcotics were in
Navarro's home. 3 The procedure was in accordance with state law," and
6Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392, 403-404 (1963) (concurring opinion). Id. at 413
(dissenting opinion).
TNote 65 infra.
'See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S.
392 (1963); Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117
(1951); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
'An indication of the scope of federal-state cooperative actions can be seen in the
following:
The area where Federal and state crimes overlap is large. It covers much of
the more common criminal activity including inter alia possession and sale
of narcotics, some types of embezzlement, sending threatening or extorting
communications in interstate commerce or the mails, interstate fleeing
from justice, various sorts of fraud, transportation of liquor into dry
states, interstate transportation or mailing of lottery tickets or obscene
matter, racketeering affecting interstate commerce, transportation in
interstate commerce of stolen goods or vehicles or falsely made or forged
securities, sale or receipt of these items and interstate white slave traffic.
State and Federal officers necessarily cooperate to a large extent in crime
prevention and law enforcement.
Parsons, State-Federal Crossfire In Search and Seizure and Self Incrimination, 42 CORNELL
L. REv. 346, 348-49 (1957). Congress has specifically encouraged cooperative action in the
enforcement of narcotic drug violations. See 21 U.S.C. § 198 (a) (1964); Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-53, § 503 (Oct. 27, 1970).
"See Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
"United States v. Navarro, 429 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1970).
121d. The fact situation is supplemented by the prior decision of Navarro v. United
States, 400 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1968).
1The Supreme Court in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) indicated the
prerequisites for a "reliable informer" as a basis for the probable cause needed in obtaining
a search warrant. See also W. LAFAvE, ARREST: TBE DEcisiON TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO
CUSTODY 265-74 (1965).
"See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 18.10 (1966). Navarro was convicted by a federal
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a search warrant was granted by a judge of a court not of record.15 The
officer then asked local agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics to join
in the search, which resulted in the discovery of heroin by a city officer,
who in turn handed it over to the federal agents. Navarro was prosecuted
in a federal court and convicted of illegal possession of heroin; however,
his conviction was reversed on the grounds that the heroin was seized
under the authority of a search warrant which failed to meet the
requirements of Rule 41 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
since it was not issued by a court of record."6 This violation of the Federal
Rules, which bind federal courts and federal law enforcement officers,
required suppression of the evidence by the federal court. 7 Since federal
agents had participated in the search, federal procedural standards applied
to the admissability of the evidence in the federal courts."
Navarro's freedom was short lived, however, for the United States
Attorney who prosecuted him in his original federal trial became, in the
interim, a state district attorney. He initiated state criminal proceedings
against Navarro for violation of state narcotics laws arising from the
same circumstances which formed the basis for the overturned federal
conviction."
Navarro brought suit in a federal district court to enjoin the federal
officers from testifying in the state prosecution regarding the fruits of the
illegal search and from turning over the physical evidence to state
authorities or, in the alternative, requiring the officers to recapture that
evidence if already in state hands. 20 The district court refused to issue the
district court of illegal possession of heroin but this was reversed on the basis of a violation
of Rule 41 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The circuit court of appeals did
not deal with the validity of the search under the constitutional requirements of the fourth
amendment but did note that the district court had addressed the issue stating "that this
procedure just barely qualifies." Navarro v. United States, 400 F.2d 315, 316 n. I (5th Cir.
1968).
"Navarro v. United States, 400 F.2d 315, 316 (5th Cir. 1968).
'Navarro v. United States, 400 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1968). Rule 41 (a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:
(a) Authority to Issue Warrant. A search warrant authorized by this rule
may be issued by a judge of the United States or of a state, commonwealth
or territorial court of record or by a United States commissioner within
the district wherein the property sought is located.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (a) (emphasis added).
"Navarro v. United States, 400 F.2d 315, 318-19 (5th Cir. 1968). The Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure provide for harmless error. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52 (a).
"Navarro v. United States, 400 F.2d 315, 318-19 (5th Cir. 1968). For an explanation of
the participation doctrine and its effects see notes 44 and 45 infra.
"United States v. Navarro, 429 F.2d 928, 929, 933 n.2 (5th Cir. 1970). For a discussion
of the propriety of successive prosecutions by state and federal courts see L. MILLER,
DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 97-127 (1968).
"Rule 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the return of
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injunctions. The court of appeals affirmed the decision as to the physical
evidence, but, relying on Rea v. United States,"' held that the federal
agents should have been enjoined from testifying.22 In Rea there had also
been a violation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the
Supreme Court based its decision requiring the federal officers to be
enjoined on its "supervisory powers over federal law enforcement
agencies." ' 22 If the violation in the principal case had been of
constitutional dimensions, Mapp v. Ohio2 would have required the
exclusion of the fruits of the search in state criminal proceedings whether
gathered by state or federal officers. However, in the case under analysis,
the search was conducted in accordance with constitutional mandates; the
only violation was the failure to obtain a search warrant from ajudge of a
court of record as required by the Federal Rules.?
In considering the question of enjoining the federal officers from
turning over the heroin to state authorities, the circuit court was faced
with a dichotomy in precedent. The Supreme Court has steadfastly
adhered to the principle that federal courts should refuse to enjoin the use
in state criminal proceedings of evidence obtained in violation of federal
law by state officers.2 1 Furthermore, federal courts may not enjoin state
officers from testifying in state criminal proceedings concerning the fruits
of their searches which fail to meet the standards of the Federal Rules.
2
1
On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Rea enjoined a federal officer
from making the fruits of an illegal search available to the state
prosecutor3 s Based on this "double standard" for the admissability of
evidence and considerations of comity in the federal system, the circuit
illegally acquired property when a motion to suppress is granted. It "shall be restored unless
otherwise subject to lawful detention and it shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing
or trial." FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e). The heroin in the principal case would be subject to lawful
detention, but it has been argued that the "any trial" provision should include a subsequent
state trial. See Eichner, Impact of the Rea Case on the Law of Illegal Search and Seizure, 9
U. FLA. L. REV. 178, 181, 188 (1956).
21350 U.S. 214 (1956). The Rea decision was limited in Wilson v. Schnettler. 365 U.S.
381 (1961) to situations in which an indictment had been instituted in a federal court and a
suppression order had been granted by that court. But Rea was still controlling in the
principal case and required the enjoining of the federal agents. United States v. Navarro, 429
F.2d 928, 930-31 (5th Cir. 1970).
"United States v. Navarro, 429 F.2d 928, 929 (5th Cir. 1970).
"Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 217 (1956).
-367 U.S. 643 (1961). "We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissable in a state court." Id. at
655.
2 United States v. Navarro, 429 F.2d 928, 932 (5th Cir. 1970).
2*1d. at 931. Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S.
117 (1951). See also Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
-429 F.2d at 931. Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392 (1963).
z1429 F.2d at 921. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
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court in the principal case concluded that the state officers were entitled to
recover the evidence which they had first discovered in the joint search.
29
Since the state warrant was constitutionally valid, the state officials who
made the discovery were acting lawfully, and the court held that they had
not lost the right to possession of the evidence by allowing the federal
prosecution to proceed initially. Based on the fact situation of the case, the
federal agents were not required to retain control of the federally
suppressed evidence.3 Furthermore, an injunction in these circumstances
would have threatened the express command of Congress that federal and
state enforcement agencies cooperate in investigations and prosecutions of
narcotic violations.3' Likewise, an injunction was not necessary in this
case to protect either the integrity of the Federal Rules or the court's prior
decision to suppress the evidence in the federal prosecution of Navarro.
32
While there was no dissent in the principal case, the concurring judge
expressed "considerable disinclination"3 with the decision which he
characterized as representing the "reverse silver platter"' a doctrine. He
contended that the decision permits forum shopping and felt that the long
delayed state prosecution should be enjoined on the grounds of public
policy. Furthermore, the concurring judge stated that the "reverse silver
platter" doctrine should be laid to rest just as the "silver platter 35
doctrine which grew up under Wolf v. Colorado" was extinguished in
Elkins v. United States.
3 7
The traditional common law doctrine was that evidence otherwise
competent was not objectionable even though it had been procured by
illegal means.- Following this approach both federal and state courts
"429 F.2d at 932. It should be noted that possession of heroin is both a federal and state
crime.
34Id. at 932.
311d. at 932. See 21 U.S.C. § 198 (a) (1964).
3'United States v. Navarro, 429 F.2d 928, 932 (5th Cir. 1970). Obvious attempts of
federal agents to use state officers in a joint search as a means of circumventing federal
requirements would meet with little success. See Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392, 399-401
(1963). In the principal case there had been no evidence of bad faith on the part of either
federal or state officers. See Navarro v. United States, 400 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1968).
3429 F.2d at 932.
U"Reverse silver platter" situations exist when the illegally procured evidence of federal
agents has been handed over to state officers for state prosecution. See Cleary v. Bolger, 371
U.S. 392, 404 (1963). For a possibly more accurate description of the situation of the
principal case see note 45 infra.
l'-his phrase was coined in Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949). A "silver
platter" situation exists when the illegally procured evidence of state officers has been
handed over to federal agents for federal prosecution. See note 44 infra.
'338 U.S. 25 (1949).
-364 U.S. 206 (1960). United States v. Navarro, 429 F.2d 928, 932-33 (5th Cir. 1970).
3C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 137 (1954); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183
(McNaughton rev. 1961).
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freely received evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure 39 until
the decision of Weeks v. United States" barred from federal courts any
evidence seized by federal officers in violation of the fourth amendment.',
Since this federal exclusionary rule had no application to state officers,"2
the federal courts would admit in federal prosecutions evidence which
state officers had illegally seized and handed over to federal authorities
4 3
on a "silver platter."" Such a procedure was allowed so long as there was
no participation by federal agents in the unlawful search and seizure. 5 In
31See Eichner, Impact of the Rea Case on the Law of Illegal Search ahd Seizure, 9 U.
FLA. L. REv. 178, 182 (1956).
40232 U.S. 383 (1914). Prior to this decision the Supreme Court had fluctuated in its
position with respect to illegally seized evidence. Compare Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886) with Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904). See Parsons, State-Federal
Crossfire in Search and Seizure and Self Incrimination, 42 CORNELL L. REv. 346, 352-53
(1957).
1The fourth amendment reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Co sT. amend. IV.
2Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
-lhe following expresses the general rule that governed the admission of illegally seized
evidence of state officers in federal prosecutions:
Generally speaking, in the federal courts State officers are considered as
strangers as far as the use of evidence procured by search and seizure is
concerned; and although search and seizure by State officers may be
illegal, if made entirely independent of any cooperation with federal
officers, the evidence seized is usually admissable in prosecutions in the
federal courts..
United States v. Haywood, 208 F.2d 156, 158 (7th Cir. 1953).
"A "silver platter" situation exists when the illegally seized evidence of state officers
has been handed over to federal agents for federal prosecution. It differs from the
participation doctrine.
The crux of [the participation] doctrine is that a search is a search by a
federal official if he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal official if
evidence secured by state authorities is turned over to the federal
authorities on a silver platter.
Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949) (emphasis added). For the development
and extension of the participation doctrine see note 45 infra.
"Byers v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), held that unlawfully obtained evidence of a
joint search would be inadmissable in federal prosecutions -"when the federal government
itself, through its agents acting as such, participates in the wrongful search and seizure." Id.
at 33 (emphasis added). In Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927), the illegally
seized evidence of state officers was suppressed in the federal courts without any federal
participation. The state officers were viewed as acting solely on the behalf of the federal
government. There had been no state crime committed but only a federal offense. Such
evidence by state officers will be suppressed if there is only a federal intention in their actions.
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the 1949 decision of Wolf v. Colorado," the Supreme Court stated that
unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers are prohibited by the
fourteenth amendment's Due Process Clause, but the admission of such
evidence in a state court was held not to violate the Constitution. 47 Thus
while a state did not have to follow the federal exclusionary rule of Weeks,
it should not affirmatively sanction unreasonable searches and seizures."
At the date of the Wolf decision some states had voluntarily adopted the
exclusionary rule, whereas others continued to follow the common law
rule of admissibility. 9
The Wolf doctrine, that unreasonable state searches were violative of
the fourteenth amendment, was unsuccessfully invoked by the petitioner in
Stefanelli v. Minard. In that case the petitioner attempted to utilize the
federal injunctive process to prevent the use of illegally seized evidence by
officials of a state which followed the common law rule of admissibility,
and thus secure the benefits of the federal exclusionary rule. 51 The
Supreme Court, recognizing the "special delicacy of the adjustment to be
preserved between federal equitable power and State administration of its
own law," 52 affirmed the denial of the injunction and ruled that federal
courts should not intervene in state criminal proceedings in such a
situation. However, in Rea v. United States,O the Court was less hesitant
to enjoin a federal agent from testifying in a state court concerning
illegally obtained evidence that had previously been suppressed in a federal
court. The suppression had been ordered due to a violation of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, but no attempt was made by the Court to
justify the injunction as a protection of the rights given the petitioner by
these Rules." All constitutional questions were put aside and the
Thus where federal and state crimes overlap, Gambino is of little force. The concurring
judge's characterization of the principal case as "reverse silver platter" might be more
accurately described as "reverse participation doctrine." See notes 34 and 44 supra.
41338 U.S. 25 (1949).
47
1d. at 33. The appendix to this case enumerates those jurisdictions following the
common law rule of admissibility and those following the federal exclusionary rules. The
Wolf rule was qualified by Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), where the means
used by the state prosecution was sufficient to "shock the conscience," and the Court
reversed the conviction. But see Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
4See Eichner, The "Silver Platter"-No Longer Used for Serving Evidence in Federal
Courts, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 311, 313 (1960).
"Note 47 supra.
-342 U.S. 117 (1951).
"See Eichner, The "Silver Platter"--No Longer Used For Serving Evidence in Federal
Courts, 13 U. FLA. L. Rav. 311, 314 (1960).
FStefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951).
-350 U.S. 214 (1956).
"The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were meant to apply only in federal courts.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1964). Rea's rights in the state proceedings were at issue.
1971]
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injunction was based on federal courts' supervisory powers over federal
law enforcement agencies.55
Other considerations were noted by the Court in Cleary v. Bolger"'
where a state official witnessed a confession obtained from the defendant,
Bolger, by federal agents during an illegal detention under the Federal
Rules and following an unconstitutional search and seizure." No federal
charges were brought, but when the state decided to prosecute, Bolger
sought and obtained a federal injunction, based on the authority of Rea,
to prevent both federal and state officials from testifying or introducing
the illegally obtained evidence. However, the enjoining of a federal agent
when the Federal Rules had been transgressed, as in Rea, did not support
the enjoining of the state official in Cleary. The Supreme Court held that
the injunction against the state officer was improvidently granted on the
grounds that the comity principles espoused in Stefanelli were still
controlling.58 By reaffirming the independence of Stefanelli9 from the then
overruled Wolf,"0 the Court added emphasis to principles of comity which
a federal court should consider when presented with a collateral attack on
state criminal proceedings. Cleary was distinguished from Rea on the
basis that the requested injunction would be against a state officer rather
than a federal one." The Court chided the circuit court of appeals62 for not
appreciating the effect of Mapp v. Ohio 3 upon the propriety of the
injunction against the state officer where constitutional rights were
involved. Mapp provided Bolger "the opportunity for federal correction
of any denial of federal constitutional rights in the state proceeding.""
"Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 216-17 (1956).
"371 U.S. 392 (1963).
"7Bolger's confession was procured through violations of both Rule 5 (a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and the fourth amendment. Bolger v. Cleary, 293 F.2d 368, 371
(2d Cir. 1961) (dissenting opinion).
-371 U.S. 392, 396-400 (1963).
"Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951) held that a federal court should not enjoin
the introduction in a state trial of evidence seized by state officials in violation of the fourth
amendment. But the prior decision of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) had permitted
the states to formulate their own rules regarding the admissability of illegally seized
evidence.
"Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)
which had declined to extend to the states the exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
61371 U.S. 392, 399 (1963).
12Id. at 398 n.9.
-367 U.S. 643 (1961).
-371 U.S. 392, 400-01 (1963). Bolger's adequate remedy at law which precluded the
equitable remedy of injunction here was a violation of his constitutional rights which should
be raised in the state court.
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But Mapp offers no guarantee of the exclusion of evidence obtained in
violation of the Federal Rules."
In light of the preceding discussion concerning the use of evidence by
federal and state officers, the dilemma of the court in the principal case is
apparent. For reasons of comity and a policy against piecemeal review,
federal courts have been reluctant to use their injunctive power to disrupt
state criminal law enforcement." On the other hand, federal courts also
have a duty to supervise federal law enforcement agents.6 7 In the joint
search of the principal case, federal agents had violated the Federal Rules
and the evidence was suppressed by the federal court. The wisdom of
basing the decision in part on the question of whether a federal or state
officer first found the evidence when these policies conflict is questionable.
Undoubtedly courts must become more involved in elaborate fact finding
when faced with similar cases in order to ascertain the circumstances
under which the evidence was discovered or received." An additional
consideration which militates against the use of the "first found" rule is
that such use could encourage "convenient" explanations of how the
evidence was seized." Furthermore, federal and state law enforcement
officials, when confronted with evidence, should not have to concern
themselves with the question of who should "discover" it first. It would
appear that the court in the principal case took advantage, in part, of a
fortuitous fact situation to escape an admittedly difficult dilemma.
Nonetheless, the question as to what should be the general rule governing
the introduction of evidence procured by a joint search in a state court by
state officers where there has been a violation of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure remains unanswered. 70
"Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) held "that all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissable in a state
court." Id. at 655. But violations of Federal Rules do not necessarily rise to constitutional
stature. Herein is the "double standard" of the admissability of evidence in state and federal
courts. The joint search brings into play the question of which standard should govern.
"Note 8 supra.
"See Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214,217-18 (1956).
"To appreciate the possible scope of the problem, consider the overlapping areas of
federal and state crimes listed in note 9 supra.
"For a notation of the possibility of the accommodation by law enforcement officials of
their stories, and not necessarily their actions, to the law see Kuh, The Mapp Case One Year
After: An Appraisal of Its Impact in New York, 148 N.Y.L.J. 4 n.2 (Sept. 19, 1962).
"It is difficult to devise a uniform rule which protects those rights of an accused which
are of less than constitutional stature while preventing the choice of forum from varying
those same rights. A former district court judge has offered his solution to the problem.
To attempt to base a rule on the degree or weight of the state agent's
participation in a joint enforcement endeavor is wholly impractical. Either
the law should be that the use in the state courts of all evidence obtained by
state agents, illegally under federal rules or statutes, shall be enjoined by
the district courts where, in procuring that evidence, the state agents have
1971]
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A rule which emphasizes the factual situation as to the discovery of the
evidence in joint searches, such as the "first found" rule of the principal
case, would seem to discourage the cooperative actions between state and
federal officials which have been encouraged by Congress:7 Under this
rule, if the state official was not the first to discover the evidence,
noncompliance with the Federal Rules could disrupt the state criminal law
enforcement endeavor, since the state may not be able to use the evidence
due to the Federal Rules violation. If the state officials continue to pursue
state-federal cooperation, such a restriction would tend to have the
practical result of forcing compliance with the Federal Rules upon the
state officials in situations involving joint searches. For example, to avoid
disruption of its proceedings, the state officials in the principal case would
have had to obtain the search warrant from a court of record as prescribed
by the Federal Rules or rely on federal agents to obtain the warrant. Such
an indirect imposition of the requirements of the Federal Rules upon the
states would seem to be "a long step toward the destruction of the division
of powers" 2 in our federal system.
On the other hand, it is not questioned that the federal courts have a
valid interest in enforcing the Federal Rules through their supervisory
power over federal law enforcement officials. An overriding factor,
however, which must be weighed is the legislative encouragement of
been assisted in whole or in part by federal agents; or the law should be that
the admissability of such evidence in the state courts shall be left wholly in
the power of the state courts. . . . [Advocating] the former principle
means that in every case where there has been any degree of
'commendable cooperation" between federal and state enforcement
officers, and there are involved federal constitutional rights which the state
must recognize, the states are also bound to recognize and apply federal
statutes or rules of procedure, made to implement and preserve them, or
have their state proceedings disrupted by a federal court's injunction, if
they fail to do so. To require the states to follow and apply congressional
enactments and the rules of the federal courts in this fashion would
constitute a long step toward the destruction of the division of powers
Moreover, the practical consequence would be that in nearly all cases
where there had been any contact at all between federal and state
enforcement officers, leading to a state prosecution, a question would be
raised in the district courts by means of petition for an injunction to
determine whether or not such federal statutes o.r rules had been complied
with. Meanwhile, the district court would be compelled to stay the state
court proceedings until it had an opportunity to hear and decide the
matter. It takes no major prophet to envisage the "insupportable
disruption" which would result.
Bolger v. Cleary, 293 F.2d 368, 372-73 (2d Cir. 196 1) (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added),
rev'd, 371 U.S. 392 (1963).
71Note 9 supra.
"Bolger v. Cleary, 293 F.2d 368, 372 (1961).
